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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\ 
ARCHIE LEININGER, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant_, 
vs. 
I 
STEARNS- ROGER MANUF AC- \ 
TURING COMPANY, a corpora- . 
tion, XYZ COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, X, Y and Z, a co-partnership, 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants-Respo11,dents. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 
10193 
STATE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
plaintiff in an explosion in the course of his employment 
brought against defendant Stearns-Roger Manufac-
turing Company who contracted for and constructed 
a uranium ore processing plant at Mexican Hat, Utah, 
for Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation, the plaintiff's 
employer. 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
· DISPOSITION IN LOWER C·OURT 
' ' ' ..., - 1 • • I 
Foll,?~ing the pretrial hearing, Third District 
Judge A. H. Ellett~ granted a motion. for sullllnary 
judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff 
and entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment dismissing 
the action and Jor jt;~dgment _ordering the case be re-
mande.d for trial. ': . 
i .· 
i STATEMENT OF'FACTS 
The defendant, Stearns-Roger Manufacturing 
Company, a corporation, will be referred to in this 
brief as "Stearns." The Texas-Zinc Mi11erals Corpora-
tion, the plaintiff's :employer, will be referred to as 
"T-Z." 
On April 18, 1956, T-Z contracted for the con-
struction. by Stearns of a uranium ore processing plant 
near Mexican· H.at,. Utah. (Plf. Ex. I) The seven 
million dollar mill was completed by Stearns in N ovem-
ber,'I957, and turned over to ·T-Z for operation~ 
.. . . 
Stearns was experienced in · erecting, designing 
and constructing such plants, having been engaged in 
the design, engineering, fabrication and construction of 
power, petroleum, mining, sugar, chemical and aero-
space industries throughout the states of Texas, Colo-
4 
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rado and Utah, and held itself out as industrial con-
struction and design experts since I855. (Plf. Ex. I, 
R. II3, I64) 
Stearns undertook this construction, not only as 
contractor, but as the designer, engineer and industrial 
architect. (Plf. Ex. I, 2, 3, 4) 
Prior to constructing the T -Z mill, Stearns pro-
vided engineering services and procurement of equip-
ment and inspection of construction for Rare Metals 
Corporation of America, Tuba City, Arizona, uranium 
mill, and also had provided engineering services, pro-
curement of equipment, necessary construction and 
other services for the l{ermac Nuclear Fuels Corpora-
tion uranium mill at Grants, New Mexico. (R. 164, 
Ans. to Plf. Interrog. No. 35) 
Stearns conceded it had long association with Dur-
iron Corporation going back to February I, I925, when 
it was distributor for Duriron Company equipment in 
the Denver area. (R. 165) Stearns also provided engi-
neering services, procurement of equipment and neces-
sary construction for the installation of equipment with 
buildings for the Petrotomics Company, Shirley Basin, 
Wyoming. (R. 74) Stearns' association with uranium 
construction started for Rare Metals Corporation in 
1955, Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation in 1956, Ker-
mac Nuclear Fuels Corporation in 1957, and Petro-
tomics Company in 1961. (R. 74) 
On October 10, 1956, Stearns purchased for instal-
5 
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lation at T-Z, in accordance with contract specifications, 
two Durco type B-124, corrosion resisting fans. (Plf. 
Ex. 5, R. 71) These fans were delivered December 5, 
1956; and other than routine inspection and mechanical 
checking after installation to determine proper rotation 
of the fan and mechanical sufficiency, Stearns concedes 
that it did not perform any other tests on said fans. 
(R. 72) These fans were installed at T-Z chemical 
laboratory assay plant (Plf. Ex .. 2, 3, 4) and had been 
warranted by the manufacturer, the Duriron Company, 
Inc., .Dayton, Ohio~ as corrosion . resisting fans. (Plf. 
Ex .. 6): 
· "The Durco B-Series fans are completely new 
and improved exhausters for ,corrosive fumes and 
gases. ;A :p.ew design utilizing the unexcelled cor-
rosion resistence of a Duriron casing coupled 
with a Durament 20 multi-blade rotary of the 
foreward curve design, makes the Durco Fans 
completely corrosion resistent. All parts in con-
tact with the corrosive fumes are of solid corro-
, sion resistent alloys - no surface coating, paint 
or lining: to. deteriorate and fail. Durco Exhaust 
fans are used in hospitals, schools, laboratories 
and industrial application; wherever corrosive 
. fumes are· a problem." -
On· August 8, 1960, a. work order was issued by 
Mr. R. L. Maurice, chief chep1ist f~r T-Z, to dis~antle 
the west fume fan suction- blower at the chemistry 
laboratory. The west fan was dis-assembled, repaired 
and set back in place by plaintiff without incident. (R. 
88) A second work order was issued to complete main-
tenance on the east fan on August 16, 1960. This work 
6 
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was not commenced until early in September, 1960. 
While plaintiff was removing the sealing compound 
from the dismantled east fan on September 12, 1960, 
the fan exploded, seriously and permanently injuring 
plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered multiple wounds to his face, 
both eyes, left hand, arm, left leg and body. The 
wounds represented the points of entry of hundreds 
of metal fragments ranging from tiny dust-like par-
ticles to larger fragments measuring up to three ems. 
The metal fragments produced loss of vision, visual 
efficiency, impairment of muscles and nerves resulting 
in great pain and serious permanent injuries. (R. 3) 
Plaintiffi's injuries necessitated hospital, doctor 
and medical expenditures in the amount of $4,042.54 to 
date. (Plf. Ex. 14) 
The cause of this explo$ion phenomena by uncon-
troverted evidence was the fan manufacturer used an 
organic cement which contained a litharge and glycerin 
sealing compound which sealed the rear face plate hous-
ing the blower shaft on all Durco type B-124 fans. 
The fan was designed to exhaust corrosive laboratory 
fumes and gases out of the assay ovens, up through 
the fume hood into the atmosphere. The explosion 
resulted from the formation of explosive compounds 
formed from reactions between perchloric acid fumes 
• 
and this litharge glycerin organic sealing compound on 
the rear plate housing of the fan. (R. 77-82, 84, 96, 
97, Plf. Ex. 7-12) 
The scientific data concedes that perchloric acid 
7 
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is well known to. be an inherently dangerous explosive. 
If con~ensates of .perchloric acid are allowed to gather 
in the crevices between th~ assembled parts of a fan 
or o:p..any part of a fan, such. condensates may explode, 
spontaneously, by friction. or, in the presence of mod-
er~te heat, or if the fan is subject to any impact or 
prooing for the, purpose of inspection, maintenance or 
di~a~sembling. While the metals in these fans are non-
explosive, alone? or in the combination with each other, 
perchloric .residue is explosive.. (Plf. Ex. II) _The fan 
w4ich exploded during course of maintenance by plain-
tiff had accumulated perchloric acid condensates and 
was inherently a dangerous time bomb. 
R~view of the scientipc literature pertaining to the 
use of perchloric acid demonstrates that perchloric acid 
is explosive at all times, but becomes particularly peril-
ous when used in conjunction with· some organic com-
pounds. Despite the· fact that litharge and glycerin 
harden to a cement like compo~nd' upon setting, one 
theory is that· there· is some free· glycerin or glycerides 
present which, ,upon impregnation of the cement by 
perchloric acid condensates, ·results in a compound 
which can be ·exploded· upon impact, impression of 
slowly generated heat or other facts.' (Plf. Ex. I2; See 
Affidavit of Wayne 0. Ursenbach, Plf.'s 'expert, 
R. I69-I71, summarizing the characteristics of per-
chloric acid and the expert testimony that: ''the design, 
construction and components of the chemical laboratory 
at T-Z containing an exhaust blower fan with organic 
sealing tnaterials does not meet industry standards and 
8 
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safe practice standards and was inherently dangerous 
and that knowledge of said danger would or should 
have been known to any qualified contractor engaged 
in design and construction of such chemical labora-
tories, fume hoods and exhaust systems.") 
Now here in the defendant's case were these scientific 
opinions and facts disputed at all, nor were there any 
contradictory affidavits filed in the action. 
These scientific findings are set forth in witnesses' 
depositions (see depositions of Maurice, Bush, 
Williams and George), namely, that fumes from per-
chloric acid condenses on and are absorbed by the 
organic material on the fans thus creating a bomb which 
could be exploded either spontaneously or under nor-
mal maintenance. (R. 165) 
Prior to the explosion which injured plaintiff, on 
June 29, 1959, a Mr. Warren E. Bush incurred flash 
burns to both eyes when an explosion blew some of the 
identical sealing grout from around the rear cover plate 
of an exhaust fan located at the Lucius Pitkin, Inc. 
Chemical Laboratory, at the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion Mill, Grand Junction, Colorado. This explosion 
occurred when Mr. Bush prodded the seal with a screw-
driver. (Plf. Ex. 7) 
Defendant Stearns admitted in answer to plain-
tiff's Interrogatory No. 15 (R. 72) that it had knowl-
edge of the Lucius Pitkin explosion, that it also had 
knowledge of a similar explosion of a fan at the 'l.\1ba 
9 
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City mill which happened prior to August 10, 1960, 
and that it also had· information regarding a similar 
explosion on February 27, 1962, in which a workman 
was killed at the Sesquehanna Western Uranium mill 
near Riverton, Wyolll:ing. There were, therefore, two 
prior and similar explosions of these fans during nor-
mal niaintena~: One, in June, 1959, and the other 
prior to August, 1960, all prior to the explosion which 
injured plaintiff on· September 12, 1960. 
To plaintiff's request for· admission of facts (R. 
100, 101), defendant Stearns· admits ·the Duriron ex-
haust fan which it installed at Rare Metals Corporation 
Tuba City plant during 1956, which exploded prior to 
August, 1960,- contained the same organic mixture 
(the grouting cement ··which sealed the rear face plate 
to the blower housing on the fan installed at Texas-
Zinc) and was co~posed of litharge and glycerin, an 
organic material. (R. 112) Defendant Stearns also 
concedes that. the fan which exploded at Lucius Pitkin 
in June, 1959, contained the same cement mixture. 
(R. 112) Defendant Stearfl:s alleged it became aware 
of these.; facts on,ly afte! the commencement of plain-
tiff's action, and it had no knowledge of any explosions 
prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. (R. 112) 
• The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published 
a report dated September 15, 1959, entitled Issue No. 
101 (Plf. Ex. 7) which ,fully described the explosion 
experienc~d by Mr. B.ush on June 29, 1959. (R. 105) 
All fans manufactured by Duriron Company after 
10 
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November 11, 1959, were furnished with a grouting 
cement composed of a silica flour and sauereisen binder, 
a non-organic compound, instead of the litharge and 
glycerin material. (R. 74, Def. Ans. No. 36 to Plf. 
Interrog.) Defendant Stearns admits it made no 
changes in the fans installed at Texas-Zinc at any time 
prior to or after the explosion which injured plaintiff 
on September 12, 1960. (R. 74} 
Defendant Stearns admits that it gave only ordi-
nary start up instructions with information as to lubri-
cation and similar items to T-Z after it installed the fan. 
(R. 73, Ans. 22 to Plf. Interrog.) Nor were detailed 
manuals of operation and maintenance furnished to 
T-Z. (R. 73, Ans. 24 to Plf. Interrog.) 
Defendant Stearns gave plaintiff's employer no 
warning whatsoever of the inherently dangerous hazard 
in this case. 
The use of perchloric acid in connection with assay-
ing and analyzing uranium ores is a standard procedure 
throughout the uranium industry. (Depo. of Warren 
Bush, p. 6, line 17; Depo. of D'Arcy George, AEC 
Scientist, p. 48, line 141, p. 49, line 142, p. 50, line 145; 
Depo. of Robert Lewis Maurice, Jr., Chief Chemist, 
T -Z, pp. 38-40) 
At the time T-Z accepted the laboratory from con-
tractor Stearns, Chief Chemist Maurice did not kno'v 
that the cem.ent grouting (packing) in these fans was 
an organic compound, or that with the amount of per-
Il 
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chloric acid used in the laboratory, there would be 
a hazard or danger created. (Depo. of Robert Le,vis 
Maurice, Jr., p. 38, lines 9-15) 
Maurice testified, on deposition, that he instructed 
Stearns to go to the Grand Junction lab and observe 
the Duriron type of fan in use specifying these fans to 
be installed at T-Z lab in Mexican Hat, Utah. (Mau-
rice Depo., pp. 3, 4) 
Maurice admitted he did not know what caused the 
Leininger explosion but following the Leininger ex-
plosion, he ·called Lucius Pitkin lab· in Grand Junction 
and learned of the litharge· glycerin problem. (Maurice 
Depo., pp. 8, 9) Maurice had also heard about the Tuba 
City, Arizona, incident, but did not know the cause of 
the explosion. (Maurice Depo., p. 11) 
At the time Maurice ordered the maintenance 
work on the fan he did not know that the sealing cement 
was composed of litharge glycerin and therefore consti-
tuted any hazard. (Maurice Depo., p. 37, lines 12-14) 
Maurice testified on deposition that the work order 
given to plaintiff included 'the language, "Be sure to 
wash with water before removing. Watch out for acid.'' 
This, however, was a. warning .to watch for the acid 
outside the blowers (Maurice Depo., p. 6, line 24), but 
he was totally unaware of the composition of the cement 
grouting or seal. (Maurice Depo., pp. 7, 8, p. 15, lines 
10-29) It was not an explosion that Maurice had 
warned against, it was simply a precaution to keep 
workers from being burned with acid on the fans that 
12 
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he cautioned them, "to wash the fan down with water." 
(Maurice Depo., p. 20, lines 1-5) 
l\1aurice admitted that he ordered plaintiff to refill 
the grouting cement with a product called phenaline, 
but unfortunately that too was organic and dangerous, 
and this was not found out until after the accident. 
(Maurice Depo., p. 27, lines 26-30, p. 28, lines 1-12) 
Plaintiff Leininger denied that Maurice had ever 
explained to him the danger involved in doing this 
work or the risk involved. On his deposition, Mr. Lein-
inger testified that when he took the fans off their 
mounting outside the chem lab, he had to use a cutting 
torch because the bolts were stuck, and he could not use 
a wrench on them. (Leininger Depo., p. 12, line 26) 
He obtained permission to do this from his supervisor, 
Mr. Tyler. (Leininger Depo., p. 13, lines 1, 2) Nor 
was he warned about scraping or striking any part of 
the fan where the packing was located (Leininger 
Depo., p. 13, lines 15-18) The only precaution was to 
wash the fan down on the outside with a caustic solution 
furnished by Mr. Maurice. (Leininger Depo., p. 19, 
lines 9-17) With an assistant, Mr. Wells, plaintiff 
Leininger prepared to sandblast the fan preparatory 
to painting. (Plf. Depo., p. 20, lines 14-24) The sand-
blasting was halted by supervisor Tyler but without 
any reason. (Leininger Depo., p. 20, line 27) 
The injuries received by plaintiff kept him away 
from his employment from the date of the accident 
until June 1, 1961. (Leininger Depo., p. 22) 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT I. BY HOLDING THAT DE-
FENDANT CONTRACTOR WAS NOT LI-
ABLE FOR THE WORK AFTER COMPLE-
TION AND ACCEPTANCE BY T-Z. 
Even in jurisdictions which retain the rule of non-
liability of contractors after work is completed and 
accepted, there is a well recognized exception to this 
antiquated doctrine, namely that the contractor is liable 
when the product of his work is inherently or immi-
nently dangerous. See Do~ v. Holly Manufacturing 
Company_, (Cal. 19~8), 321 P.2d 736. 
This Court long ago accepted this doctrine in Berg 
v·. Otis Elevator Cornpany (1924), 64 Utah 518, 231 
Pac. 832, and again in Sutton ·v. Otis Elevator Com-
p-any ( 1926), 68 Utah 85, 249 Pac. 437, where the 
Court said: 
"In the light of the numerous authorities we 
have examined upon this question, we feel justi-
fied in saying, once for all, that the cases arising 
under the general rule are simply cases of ordi-
nary negligence. The dang~r created by the ~or~ 
is not imminent. If there Is danger at all, It IS 
usually remote and more or less improbable. It 
may well be that in a case of that kind, when the 
14 
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contractee accepts the work, he thereafter assumes 
responsibility for consequences resulting from its 
use, and the independent contractor is exempt 
fron1 liability, even for injury resulting from his 
own negligence. Such would seem to be a whole-
some rule in that class of cases. But let us suppose 
that the 'vork which the independent contractor 
undertakes to perform is of such a nature that, 
unless it is done with reasonable care, a condition 
will be created which is imminently dangerous to 
the safety of others 'vho may use the instrumen-
tality; suppose, further, that the contractor knows 
of the danger created by him, or under the cir-
cumstances is presumed to know it, and the 
danger is not known to the contractee and is so 
hidden and concealed that he cannot discover it 
upon reasonably careful inspection; suppose in 
consequence of such negligence, an accident oc-
curs and injury results - can it be consistently 
contended that the contractor can escape liability 
because the contractee, who was ignorant of the 
danger and could not discover it upon reasonable 
inspection, failed to do something which might 
have prevented the injuries? Is not this a differ-
ent situation altogether from that to 'vhich the 
general rule applies? If so, then why contend for 
immunity which is obtainable only under the 
general rule?" 
Restatement of 'Torts, Section 385, American Law 
Institute, states the modern rule: 
"One who on behalf of the possessor of land 
erects a structure or creates any other condition 
thereon is subject to liability to others within or 
without the land for bodily harm caused to them 
by the dangerous character of the structure or 
condition after his work has been accepted by the 
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poss~ss~r. under the same rules *** determining 
the hab1hty of one who as manufacturer or in-
dependent contractor makes a chattel for the use 
of others." 
Comment b, Section 385, states: 
"As the liability of a servant or an independent 
contractor who erects a structure upon land or 
otherwise changes its physical condition is deter-
mined by the same rules as those which determine 
the liability of a manufacturer of chattel, it fol-
lows that such a servant or contractor who turns 
over the land with knowledge that his work has 
made it dangerous in a manner unlikely to be 
discovered by the possessor is subject to liability 
both to the possessor, and those who come upon 
the land with the consent of the possessor or who 
are likely to be in its vicinity." 
In such cases the negligence of the contractee, if 
any, in accepting the work and putting it to use does 
not cancel the negligence of the contractor in creating 
the dangerous condition for as the Restatement, Com-
ment b, Section 385, continues: 
"A servant or contractor who turns over the 
land to his employer in a condition made danger-
ous by his failure to exercise reasonable care, is 
liable for harm caused by it, after his employer 
has accepted the work, not only to his employer 
but to all persons whom he should expect to be 
upon the land with the consent of his employer or 
to be in its vicinity." 
Here defendant Stearns' original negligence 
ripened into injury after completion and acceptance 
of the uranium mill. Plaintiff's theory of defendant's 
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
liability, both in negligence and in breach of warranty, 
is this - the design and construction of this chemical 
laboratory by Stearns was defective either by virtue 
of the condition it was in when the work was completed, 
or by virtue of its likelihood of becoming dangerous 
through its normal and foreseeable use. 
Installation of the Duriron fan, containing an 
organic sealing compound, which in time by exhausting 
perchloric acid fumes, created a bomb which Stearns 
knew, should have known, or by reason of its special 
skill and competence had reason to know, the likelihood 
of the explosion hazard involved. 
Plaintiff's case, based upon five separate causes 
of action, sets forth not only design and construction 
negligence but failure to test, and determine the con-
cealed danger as well as failure to warn the plaintiff; 
and three causes in breach of warranty, express war-
ranty, implied warranty of merchantability and fitness 
for purpose. 
The case law in support of these doctrines is fully 
annotated at 58 A.L.R.2d, p. 891 through 898. 
In Hanna v. Fletcher (1956), 97 App. D.C. 310, 
231 F.2d 469, 58 A.L.R. 2d 847, cert. deniedJ it was 
held: 
"A person injured by reason of the con-
tractor's negligence may recover from the con-
tractor even if the injury occurred after the pro-
duct of his defective work was accepted by the 
party who engaged him.'' 
17 
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The quote relied on the landmark decision, MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Compa·ny~ Ill N.E. 1050. See 
Dean Prosser, "The Law of Torts," 2d Ed. Sec. 85, 
p. 519, holding: 
"Independent building and construction 
contractors should be held to a general standard 
of reas.onable care for the protection of third 
parties who may be foreseeably in danger by the 
contractor's negligence even after acceptance of 
the work.'' 
This doctrine has been accepted in Foley v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Co. (1949), 68 A.2d 517, in which the 
manufacturer of a large tank was held liable for its 
negligence in failing to use reasonable care in the design 
and construction of the tank, in the selection of the 
materials used in its manufacture and in the test to 
determine the safety thereof. 
As Judge Cardozo held in B1tick~ supra: 
"If the nature of the thing is such that it is 
reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril 
when negligently made, it is then a thing of 
danger. Its nature gives warning of the conse-
quences to be expected. If to the element of 
danger there is added knowledge that the thing 
will be used by persons other than the purchaser, 
and used without new tests, then, irrespective 
of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of 
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. *** 
If danger was to be expected ~s. reasonably ce~­
tain, there was a duty of vigilance, and this 
whether you call the danger inherent or immi-
nent." 
18 
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Thus, contractor Stearns' liability is based on its 
creation of an unreasonable risk of harm and not upon 
the kind of commodity which it installed. 
The Buick rule has been extended to building con-
tractors and repairmen. See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des 
Moin~s Steel Co._, 166 F.2d 908 (3rd Cir. 1948); 
Thompson v. Bttrke Engineering Sales_, 252 Iowa 146, 
106 N.W.2d 351 (1960); Inman v. Binghampton_, 3 
N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895 (1957); Boutell v. Scott-'s 
Royal Tire Co._, 365 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. App. 1963); 
Spencer v. Madson_, 142 F.2d 820 {lOth Cir. 1944). 
In the field of products liability law, the trend has 
been from negligence to strict warranty liability. See 
the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors_, 
Inc._, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 {1960), and the cases 
which dispense with the privity rule in express warranty 
cases starting with Randy Knitwear_, Inc. v. American 
Cyanamid Co._, 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399 {1962). 
In accord: Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co._, 
290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 {1939); Arfons v. E. I. 
DuPont de Nemours ~ Co._, 261 F .2d 434 ( 2d Cir. 
1958); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co._, 167 O~hio 
St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958); Hamen v. Firestone 
Tire ~ Rubber Co._, 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960); 
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co._, 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 
409 (1932). 
See also Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 
Yale L.J. 1099, 1114-24 (1960). 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The modern rule of strict privity free warranty 
liability developed since DiVello v. Gardner Machine 
Co._, 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951), now finds 
expression in Restatement (Second) Torts, Section 
402a, approved May 1, 1961, doing away with the 
privity requirement at all levels of manufacturing and 
distribution and imposing on sellers coming within its 
terms the full responsibility of strict liability. 
While Section 402a refers to products for intimate 
bodily use, the decisions now go beyond such limitations 
and hold the manufacturer of any product which is 
likely to be dangerous if defective to strict privity free 
liability. See Spence v. Three Rivers Builders ~ Ma-
sonry Supply_, Inc._, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 
(!1958); Conti.nental Copper ~ Steel Industries v. 
E. C. "'"Red"'"' Cornelius_, Inc._, 104 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 
1958); McBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp., 
137 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1962); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. 
Hammond_, 269 F.2d 501 (lOth Cir. 1959); Peterson 
v. Lamb Rubber Co._, 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1961); Jar-
not v. Ford Motor Co._, 156 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. 
1959); Henningsen v. Bloo~field Motors_, Inc._, 32 N.J. 
358, 161 A.2d 69 ( 1960) ; General Motors Corp. v. 
Dodson_, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655; Pabon 
v. Hackensack Auto Sales_, Inc._, 63 N.J. Super. 476, 
164 A.2d 773 (1960); Connolly v. Hagi_, 24 Conn. Sup. 
198, 188 A.2d 884 ( 1963). 
A case which carries the manufacturer's strict 
liability even further is Greenman v. Yuba Power 
20 
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Products~ Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), where Jus-
tice Traynor states, "A manufacturer of any prod-
uct who sells it in a condition dangerous for use is 
strictly liable to its ultimate use for injuries resulting 
from such use, despite absence of privity of contract 
and exercise of all possible care." 
See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. and 
Lockheed A.ircraft Corp.~ 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S. 
2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81 (Court of Appeals, New York, 
May 9, 1963). 
The Goldberg decision is followed by a recent Cali-
fornia landmark case, Vandermark v. Ford Motor 
Compa·ny~ 391 P.2d 168 (1964}: 
"Retailers like manufacturers are engaged in 
the business of distributing goods to the p_ublic. 
They are an integral part of the overall produc-
ing and marketing enterprise that should bear 
the cost of injuries resulting from defective prod-
ucts. In some cases the retailer may be the only 
member of that en~rprise reasonably available 
to the injured plaintiff. In other cases the retailer 
himself may play a substantial part in insuring 
that the product is safe or may be in a position to 
exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; 
the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added 
incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manu-
facturer and retailer alike affords maximum pro-
tection to the injured plaintiff and works no in-
justice to the defendants, for they can adjust the 
·costs of such protection between them in the 
course of their continuing business relationship." 
These rules focus responsibility for defects, 
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whether negligently or non-negligently caused, on the 
manufacturer of the completed product, and they apply 
regardless of what part of the manufacturing process the 
manufacturer chooses to delegate to third parties. 
Logically, therefore, if defendant Stearns, as the 
building contractor, is chargeable with the same liability 
of one who as a manufacturer makes a chattel for the 
use of others, then the inherent defect in this fan is 
chargeable to Stearns, the building contractor, designer 
and industrial architect of this plant. 
Indeed, defendant Stearns by its contract with 
T-Z (Plf. Ex. 1, Art. 16, p. 19) placed itself in the 
position of the manufacturer, Duriron Company: 
"Guaranties: 
The Contractor guarantees the work, material, 
equipment and supplies against defective work-
manship and material until the expiration of one 
(I). year from the date of final acceptance of 
the work by the Company. With respect to the 
Contractor's guaranty as to material, equipment 
and supplies, it is agreed that the Contractor will 
be saved and held harmless by the Company from 
damage claims of any nature beyond the replace-
ment or repair of the defective material, equip-
ment and supplies, f.o.b. factory, it being under-
stood that the Con.tractor~s guaranty as to mate-
rial~ equipment and supplies does not go beyon~ 
and back of the dealers~ and manufacturers 
guaranties where such material~ equipment and 
snpp.Zies were selected by the Company and pur-
chased by the Contractor.n (Emphasis supplied) 
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Thus, defendant Stearns makes the identical warranty 
set forth in plaintiff's Exhibit 6, 
"No surface coating, paint or lining to dete-
riorate and fail." 
The rule seems now clear that a building contrac;.. 
tor can no longer hide behind the out-moded "work 
accepted and completed doctrine'' and even the demand 
requiring a showing of negligence and privity of con-
tract is no longer required. Building contractors, in-
cluding manufacturers, must stand behind their work 
and products with the risk to users from defective pro-
ducts cast upon industry as an enterprise risk. 
The lower Court could have more logically granted 
a plaintiff's motion for liability, than dismissing the 
case, on any of plaintiff's five theories. Plaintiff sub-
mits that Otis Elevator~ if it is still Utah law, should be 
soundly overturned. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT II. BY HOLDING THAT DE-
FENDANT STEARNS WAS NOT LIABLE 
BECAUSE THE FAN WAS SELECTED BY 
AND FURNISHED AT REQUEST OF T-Z, 
PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYER. 
Defendant seeks to escape liability by urging that 
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T-Z selected and requested the specific fan, and Stearns 
simply carried out its directions. 
The evidence is overwhelming and the expert 
testimony of chief chemist Maurice, Mr. Bush, Mr. 
George and the affidavit of plaintiff's expert Ursen-
bach, demonstrate uncontrovertibly that no reasonable 
contractor would install a fan containing an organic 
material to be used in connection with exhausting per-
chloric fumes. But this defense raises a jury question 
and does not entitle Stearns to judg1nent as a matter 
of law._ 
True, defendant Stearns is not a simple supplier 
of chattels, like a retailer, who is excused from exercis-
ing unusual care in searching out hidden defects in 
articles made by responsible manufacturers; but where, 
as here, defendant Stearns with its special skill and 
competence in the chemical industry knew, should have 
known, or had reason to know the concealed danger, 
whether patent or latent, its liability is clear. The 
danger of an explosion during normal maintenance 
of this fan was obvious and foreseeable and where 
through the exercise of its own skill and experience 
Stearns could or should or had reason to realize that 
harm was foreseeable, if the equipment requested by 
T-Z was installed, the defense that T-Z selected such 
equipment should not bar this action as a matter of law. 
Stearns may have relied upon Duriron Company's 
express warranty that this fan contained, "no coating, 
lining or paint that would deteriorate or fail," but it had 
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an overriding duty to this plaintiff to test and check 
the sealing compound upon installation and determine 
whether or not it was organic in nature, well knowing 
that perchloric acid condensates create a time bomb. 
As Judge Medina states in Fredericks v. American 
Export Line (2d Cir. 1955), 227 F.2d 450: 
" *** A bomb is nonetheless deadly if it con-
tains a time mechanism. On the other hand, evi-
dence of the passage of time, together with that 
of other attendant circumstances, is admissible, 
in order that a jury may not be led astray. The 
mere passage of time confers no immunity upon 
a :qegligent wrongdoer; but it has relevance to 
_the likelihood, depending upon the circumstances 
of a particular case, that deterioration due to use, 
perhaps accelerated my misuse, will be mistaken 
by a jury for a defect due to negligent manu-
facture or fabrication. On the evidence before us 
in this case, we cannot say the jury went beyond 
permissible and rational inference in attributing 
the accident to Farrington's negligent fabricatio~ 
of the skid iron, which cracked and came a part, 
despite at least two and one-half years of ap-
parently safe use and normally rough handling." 
Stearns was the industrial architect and designer 
of this plant; it fashioned the plans and specifications 
(Plf. Ex. 2, 3, 4). The fact that it incorporated Dur-
iron fans, requested by 'f-Z, does not insulate Stearns 
from liability since a reasonable person would have 
determined first whether or not the fan contained a 
dangerous organic material, and Stearns should not 
escape liability because it followed out T-Z's recom-
mendations. The contractor should not be able to hide 
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behind the skirts of T-Z when Stearns was the designer, 
architect and engineer and where through the exercise 
of its own skill and experience, contractor could realize 
that harm was foreseeable if a defective fan was 
installed. 
The warranty of Duriron was the warranty of 
defendant Stearns. (R. 196, 197) 
The A.E.C. knew the inherent danger early in 
1956 when it required a vVinchester, Massachusetts, lab 
to be rebuilt and replaced all hoods and ducts made out 
of plastic and ceramic and stone. (George Depo., p. 48, 
49) These procedures were well known to chemists 
since 1952 (see Ursenbach Affidavit, R. 169, 170, 171) 
and should have been equally within the knowledge of 
Stearns. The fact that the defect was latent does not 
excuse Stearns. 
The grouting was open and obvious (see Ex. A 
and B, attached to Bush deposition, closeup of similar 
fan). The "X" marked on Exhibit A indicates the 
deteriorated area of the grouting, it would have been 
obvious to any one who looked or tested. Mr. ~ush 
received his injury on June 29, 1959, when he simply 
prodded the stuff with a screwdriver (see Bush Depo., 
p. 7, 8, 9). 
Rather than being uninforn1ed of the hazards of 
perchloric acid, industry has been extremely cautious 
in accepting these chemicals because of their well known 
haza~dous nature. Recommended procedures have been 
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given by perchloric acid manufacturers, users and na-
tional organizations charged with the responsibility for 
safety in all phases of industry. It is no defense that 
Stearns utilized this fan in the design and construction 
of the chem lab here upon the specific request and selec-
tion of T -Z. Organic material in this fan does not meet 
industry standards and safe practice standards and- is 
inherently dangerous. ( R. 171) 
A contractor may not heedlessly install obviously 
defective equipment. Belk v. J. A.. Jones Constructio1~ 
Company~ 272 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Harley v. 
Blodgett Engineering and Tool Company~ 230 Mich. 
510, 202 N.\V. 953 (1925). See Bell, Professional 
Negligence of Architects and Engineers~ 1212 Vand. 
L. Rev. 711 and Annotations, 59 A.L.R.2d at 1072. 
Restatement of Torts, Section 353. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT III. BY HOLDING THAT EVEN 
IF DEFENDANT S'l"'EARNS WAS NEGLI-
GENT, THE KNOWLEDGE OF T-Z OF 
PRIOR EXPLOSIONS AND THE HAZ-
ARDOUS NATURE OF THE FAN IS AN 
INTERVENING CAUSE WHICI-I RE-
LIEVES DEFENDANT S'l"'EARNS FROM 
LIABILI'fY. 
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This proposition, of course, assumes that T -Z was 
thoroughly aware of the hazard. The truth is, this 
danger was unknown to T-Z. (See Maurice Depo., p. 
14, line 27, and p. 37, line 7) Maurice admits that he 
was not aware of the problem and at p. 31, line 29, 
where Mr. Maurice admits it was four to five months 
after the explosion that he learned the cause. If this was 
the case, how could plaintiff Leininger be charged with 
such knowledge. Stearns itself urges that it had no 
knowledge of the Leininger problem until after the 
commencement of the lawsuit. Notwithstanding, the 
court erred as a matter of law. 
The failure of T-Z, plaintiff's employer ,to per-
form a duty owing plaintiff to protect plaintiff from 
harm threatened by defendant Stearns' negligent con-
duct is not a superseding or intervening cause of plain-
tiff herein. Restatement of Torts, Section 452. 
This rule applies not only where a third person 
employer makes no effort to perform his duties but also 
where through his negligence, his attempt to do so is 
unsuccessful. 
Since Stearns the builder-manufacturer cannot 
relieve itself from liability by informing the person who 
is to use the product, it follows that the users knowledge 
of its dangerous character acquired from other sources 
can have 110 greater effect. See Section 389, Comment b, 
Restatement of Torts. 
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T-Z's failure to perform its duty in this respect 
may make it concurrently liable but is not a superseding 
or intervening cause. See Northwestern Nat. Insurance 
Company v. Rogers~ ·Pattern & A.luminum Found-
ry) 166 P.2d 401, and Peterson v. Rand Construc-
tion) 246 N.Y.S.2d 69, holding the intervening negli-
gence of lessee not knowingly using defective product 
does not insulate lessor from liability; and see Frede-
ricks v. American Export Line~ supra~ holding: 
"It is elementary that the concurrent negli-
gence of some third person will not absolve a 
defendant upon whom liability is sought to be 
imposed for the consequences of his own delict. 
Could the jury here, on the evidence before it, 
have properly found that the flow of causation, 
arising from the negligent fabrication of the skid 
iron by Farrington, was broken by McGrath's 
failure to discover the defect? 
That the intervening purchaser will remain 
passive or otherwise fail to do what he ought to 
do to prevent the course of events, is a reasonably 
··foreseeable consequence of the original wrong-
doing. Moreover, this is not a distinction based 
upon mere passivity but rather upon whether 
or not the ultimate fact or occurrence is reason-
ably foreseeable. This is a far cry from the doing 
of something or the refraining from doing some-
. thing constituting an improbable, independent, 
intervening cause, which is a superseding cause 
and breaks the sequence. Perry v. Rochester Lime 
Co., 219 N.Y. 60, 113 N.E. 529, L.R.A. 1917B, 
1058; Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 1946, 183 
'fenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840, 852, 164 A.L.R. 364; 
Prosser, Torts, Sec. 49 ( 1941) ." 
29 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT IV. BY ITS REFUSAL TO SUB-
MIT THE CASE TO A JURY FOR TRIAL 
ON TORT AND BREACH OF CONTRACT 
(WARRANTY) THEORIES. 
Two leading cases, Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products Cornpany_, supra_, and Strandholm v. Gen-
eral Construction Company_, 382 P.2d 843 (Ore. 
1963), sustain this proposition. In Palmer v. W a8atch 
Chemical Company (1960) 10 Utah 2d 383, 353 P.2d 
985, this court adopts Section 402, Restatement of 
Torts, and holds that case was properly submitted to 
the jury both on theories of negligence and on grounds 
of breach of contract. See Hewitt v. General Tire and 
Rubber Company_, 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471. 
The product in this case was not put to any un-
usual use. It exploded in the course of normal main-
tenance and upkeep and was warranted expressly and 
by implication to be fit for such purposes. 
The lower court entirely ignored plaintiff's third, 
fourth and fifth causes of action which alleged breach 
of express warranty, and breach of implied warranties of 
fitness and merchantability, in addition to the first two 
causes setting forth the general negligence. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
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GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
'fiON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT V. BY REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBITS NUMBERS 8, 9, IO, II AND I2 IN 
EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff produced the affidavit of Wayne 0. Ur-
senbach, an expert witness (R. I69, I70, I7I), the depo-
sitions of chief chemist Maurice, A.E.C. employees 
Bush and George, who freely conceded that the use of 
perchloric acid was standard in the uranium industry 
and that its use in connection with an exhaust fan con-
taining organic material was inherently and imminently 
dangerous. Reputation of these experts has not been 
challenged. 1,heir expert opinion, which also has been 
expressed in A.E.C. reports and articles given nation-
wide dissemination, must be determined to have been 
inferably within the knowledge of Stearns as it was 
within the knowledge of the manufacturer, Duriron 
Company, as well as others in the uranium industry. 
These facts are set forth in plaintiff's proffered Ex-
hibits 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, all of which were erroneously 
rejected by the pretrial judge. The Court's attention is 
called to the language of plaintiff's Exhibit II: 
"March 19, 1962 
SUBJECT: 
EXHAUST OF PERCHLORIC ACID 
FUMES 
To Users of Durco Fans: 
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. We are advised that standard fans manufac-
tured by our Company are being employed under 
varying conditions to exhaust the fumes from 
perchloric acid (particularly in wet chemical 
processes for analysis of ores of the rare earth 
variety) and that a recent explosion, in which 
one of our fans was involved, resulted in a fatality 
in the plant of such a user. 
It is well known that perchloric acid is in-
herently explosive. If condensates of perchloric 
acid are allowed to gather in the crevices between 
the assembled parts of a fan or, for that matter, 
on any parf of the fan, such condensates may 
explode, spontaneously, by friction or in the 
presence of moderate heat or if the fan is subject 
to any impact or probing .for the purpose, for 
example, of inspection, maintenance or disassem-
bling. 
The metals and all other materials employed 
in our fans are nonexplosive, alone, or in the 
combination with each other. Perchloric residue, 
however, is explosive whether in a fan, hood, duct 
or elsewhere. 
In view of the hazards inherent in perchloric 
acid we have decided that hereafter we will not 
sell any fans for use to exhaust perchloric acid 
fumes. 
If you continue to use or recommend to others 
the use of any of our fans in the presence of per-
chloric acid fumes, you must do so at your own 
risk and with full knowledge that if the fan ac-
cumulates perchloric acid condensates there will 
exist an inherent possibility of explosion. 
Very truly yours, 
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THE DURIRON COMPANY, INC. 
Is/ W. D. Staley 
W. D. Staley, 
Executive Vice President." 
These documents were offered for the purpose of 
showing, notwithstanding the date each _document 
bears, that the hazard and danger must be determined 
to have been inferably within the knowledge of Stearns, 
and the jury could have found that Stearns had, should 
have had, or had reason to have such knowledge, at the 
time it installed the fans. The exhibits were not offered 
to show other and similar fan explosions, but for the 
purpose of notice of the inherent danger. 
THE LOWER COUR'l., ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANT STEARNS' MO-
TION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CASE: 
POINT VI. IN THAT SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR JURY 
TRIAL. 
As this Court has so often reasoned, it is only 
where it is perfectly clear that there are no issues in the 
case that summary judgment is proper. Here the evi-
dence, admissions, and inferences, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to plaintiff, show the existence of 
genuine issues as to material facts and that the defend-
ants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
See Green v. Garn~ II Utah 2d 375, 359 P.2d I050; 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc.~ II Utah 
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2d 1, 354 P.2d 559. Even in cases where the judge is 
of the opinion that he may direct a verdict for one party 
or the other on the issues that have been raised, he 
should ordinarily hear the evidence and direct the ver-
dict rather than attempt to try the case in advance on a 
motion for summary judgment, which was never in-
tended to enable parties to avert jury trials or have 
the judge weigh evidence in advance of its being pre-
sented. "It is the general proposition that issues of 
negligence, including such related issues as contributory 
negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary 
adjudication either for or against the claimant, but 
should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." 
See 6 Moore~ s Federal Practice~ 2232 Section 56.17 
( 42). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the lower court, 
committed gross error in dismissing his case and prays 
this court reverse the lower court's judgment remand-
ing the matter for jury trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. WALLY SANDACK 
Draper, Sandack & Saperstein 
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Dated: October 1, 1964. 
34 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
